APP Fraud Reimbursement in the UK: Rules, Rights, Operations
Under UK rules, payment firms must reimburse eligible authorised push payment fraud victims within five business days, up to £85,000 per claim, and share the cost with the receiving firm.
Key takeaways
- In the UK, sending payment firms must reimburse eligible APP fraud victims within five business days, with a hard backstop of 35 business days and a £85,000 per-claim maximum
- The cost is shared with the receiving payment firm by default at 50:50 — a rule that applies to all payment service providers, not only banks
- A firm can refuse a UK claim only for customer fraud or gross negligence, judged against four defined expectations, and the cap does not apply to vulnerable consumers
- PSR data for the 18 months to 31 March 2026 shows about 88% (£316m) of in-scope losses reimbursed across 438,300 reported claims, 301,500 of them in scope
What APP fraud reimbursement covers in the UK
Authorised push payment (APP) fraud is a payment a customer genuinely authorises after being deceived — a fake invoice, a spoofed caller, a romance scam. Because the customer pressed send, the money moves over ordinary rails, and for years the loss landed with the victim. In the UK that default changed on 7 October 2024, when the Payment Systems Regulator (PSR) introduced a mandatory reimbursement requirement for Faster Payments APP scams, with the Bank of England aligning the CHAPS position in parallel (PSR, APP fraud reimbursement protections).
The top-level rule is deliberately simple: the firm that sent the payment — the sending payment service provider (PSP) — must reimburse an eligible victim and share the cost with the firm that received the funds. Everything difficult sits underneath: eligibility, evidence, timing, and what happens when the two firms disagree about fault.
Who is covered in the UK
Individuals, small businesses and charities. The PSR's reporting framework defines the coverage as individuals, small businesses and charities with annual income below £1 million (PSR reimbursement dashboard). The obligation falls on banks, building societies, e-money institutions and other PSPs using the in-scope systems — it is not a rule that binds only the large banks. Credit unions, municipal banks and national savings banks are outside the arrangements (PSR, APP fraud reimbursement protections).
What sits outside the UK regime
Coverage is narrower than headlines suggest. It applies to UK bank transfers over Faster Payments and CHAPS only. Card, cash and cheque payments have their own protections, international payments fall outside, and a civil dispute — paying a legitimate supplier for goods that never arrive — is not APP fraud because there is no intent to defraud. Nor does it cover first-party fraud, where the customer is part of the deception. That boundary matters commercially: it is a standing incentive for fraud to migrate towards the channels where the victim still carries the loss.
The core parameters of a UK claim
| Parameter | What the UK rule requires | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Start date | Payments made on or after 7 October 2024 | PSR |
| Decision deadline | Five business days, extendable with a "stop the clock", with a hard backstop of 35 business days | PSR |
| Maximum reimbursement | £85,000 per claim for Faster Payments (set by the PSR) and £85,000 per claim for CHAPS (set by the Bank of England) | PSR PS24/7 |
| Optional excess | Up to £100, and never applied to a vulnerable consumer | PSR PS25/5 |
| Minimum threshold | None — there is no lower bound on claim size | PSR PS25/5 |
| Claim window | A sending PSP may refuse a claim submitted more than 13 months after the final payment | PSR PS25/5 |
The £85,000 ceiling was a late change and is worth understanding, because it explains why the cap is debated. The PSR's December 2023 policy statement originally set the maximum at £415,000, aligned to the Financial Ombudsman Service limit at the time (PSR PS23/4). In September 2024 the PSR consulted on lowering it to the Financial Services Compensation Scheme deposit limit of £85,000, and the previous £415,000 figure is stated explicitly in that consultation (PSR CP24/11). The October 2024 policy statement confirmed £85,000, estimating that this level would fully reimburse 99.8% of all Faster Payments APP scams by volume and 90% by value, provided they fall in scope. The Bank of England, as operator of CHAPS, separately decided to set the CHAPS maximum at the same £85,000 per claim, so that limits are consistent across the two systems (PSR PS24/7).
Losses above the cap are not automatically wasted. In the UK a dissatisfied customer can escalate to the Financial Ombudsman Service, which has a compensation limit of £430,000 and assesses cases on their individual merits, free of charge (PSR).
The consumer standard of caution
Under the UK rules there are two exceptions to the general reimbursement obligation: the customer acted fraudulently, or the customer acted with gross negligence. Gross negligence is not left undefined — it is narrower, and the PSR confirms it through four expectations, usually shortened to the consumer standard of caution (PSR PS23/4):
- Have regard to interventions. If the sending firm, or a competent authority, gives a specific warning that the payment is likely to be a scam, the customer is expected to take it into account.
- Report promptly. The customer should tell the sending firm as soon as they learn or suspect they have been scammed, and in any event within 13 months of the last payment.
- Share information. The customer should answer reasonable and proportionate requests for information needed to assess the claim, including requests made under the stop-the-clock rules.
- Report to the police, or consent to the firm doing so. Refusal alone is not gross negligence; the firm must consider the circumstances, including vulnerability.
Three practical points follow. First, gross negligence is a higher bar than ordinary negligence and is confined to a closed list — firms cannot invent extra conditions or demand more than the policy allows. Second, the exception and the optional excess must not be applied to vulnerable consumers at all (PSR PS25/5). Third, information requests have to be proportionate to the value and complexity of the claim; requests designed to frustrate a claim are not legitimate.
That boundary is doing real work in practice. In the 18 months to 31 March 2026, only about 3% of UK claims were rejected because the customer had not taken enough care over the transaction or the claim (PSR reimbursement dashboard).
How the cost is shared between payment firms
Once a sending PSP has reimbursed its customer, it can claim half the amount from the receiving PSP. Two points are commonly misreported. First, this is a PSP-to-PSP rule, not a bank-to-bank one: e-money institutions and other in-scope payment firms are parties to it. Second, the receiving PSP pays the lower of 50% of what the victim was actually paid, or 50% of the required reimbursement amount attributable to it. A firm cannot request a contribution before it has paid its own customer (PSR PS25/5).
The default split is calculated on the assumption that the maximum £100 excess was applied. If a sending PSP waives or reduces its excess, it cannot recover the difference from the receiving PSP — a small but real cost of competing on consumer-friendly excess policies.
It is also worth being clear that 50:50 is a default, not a forensic allocation of fault. Both sides can depart from it through negotiation, mediation or the dispute process in the scheme rules, and evidence of each firm's prevention controls can shift the split. At the receiving end the account holder is very often an unwitting money mule, and blocking a genuine transaction creates its own friction and complaint risk.
Operational controls payment teams need
In the UK, reimbursement is a governance problem before it is a payments problem. The controls that consistently show up in well-run operations:
- Name-checking at the point of payment. Confirmation of Payee (CoP) is the first line of defence. The PSR reports that over 320 organisations now offer CoP checks, covering more than 99% of Faster Payments transactions, with over two million checks completed every day (PSR CoP compliance report).
- Warnings that are recorded, not just displayed. To rely on the "have regard to interventions" limb later, a firm must be able to show what warning appeared, when, and what the customer did next.
- Claim intake with a clock attached. The five-business-day deadline runs from the report of the claim, so the measurement point, the stop-the-clock justification and the 35-business-day backstop all need to live inside the case system.
- Evidence discipline on inbound accounts. Mule detection, account-age and velocity checks, and intelligence sharing determine both fraud losses and how much of a 50:50 split a receiving firm can argue away.
- Machine-readable management information. The PSR's compliance data reporting standards require firms to report claim volumes and values closed within five business days, within 35 business days, claims above the £85,000 cap, and rejections under the standard of caution with reason codes. Building those fields after the fact is expensive.
- A complaints path built to survive scrutiny. Claims management companies handle a meaningful share of consumer claims, and cases can end up before the Ombudsman.
Risks and costs
- Residual loss is real. The cap and the optional excess mean some victims still lose money, and international payments and other payment systems sit outside the regime. UK Finance's annual fraud report records £450.7 million of UK APP fraud losses in 2024, of which £267.1 million — around 59% — was reimbursed by banks across that year. Its data covers a wider range of payments and account types than the PSR rules, so the two are not directly comparable (UK Finance, fraud report 2025).
- Costs vary sharply between firms. The PSR's first-anniversary review found wide variation in outcomes between PSPs, with some firms absorbing materially higher costs than before the rules while others saw reductions (PSR, one year on).
- Gross negligence disputes are contentious. Treating a vulnerable customer as grossly negligent is a supervisory and Ombudsman risk, and the exception is limited to a closed list of four expectations.
- Vulnerability assessment is a control, not a courtesy. It determines whether the excess and the standard of caution can be applied at all.
- Friction has a cost too. Aggressive blocking and payment holds reduce fraud but also produce false declines, call volumes and complaints — a trade-off no single rule resolves.
- Data quality drives supervisory visibility. Reported metrics are published and comparable, so inconsistent reason codes create reputational and regulatory exposure.
- Nothing here is a recommendation. These figures describe market outcomes and regulatory requirements, not the merits of any product, account or provider.
Bottom line
In the UK, the default has shifted: an APP scam payment over Faster Payments or CHAPS is the sending firm's liability unless the firm can rely on one of two narrow exceptions, with a five-business-day clock, a 35-business-day backstop, an £85,000 per-claim ceiling and a 50:50 default split with the receiving PSP. The PSR's dashboard reports that in the 18 months to 31 March 2026, 88% (£316 million) of in-scope losses were reimbursed, 82% of claims were closed within five business days and 98% within 35, across about 438,300 reported claims with 301,500 in scope (PSR dashboard). The PSR has also committed to keep the maximum reimbursement level under review as part of its ongoing evaluation of the policy. Those averages hide large firm-level differences, and the parameters remain open to change — which is why the operational question for payment teams is whether their claims intake, warning evidence, mule detection, dispute documentation and reporting fields are already good enough to be audited.
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