BNPL Regulations in the US: Models, Fees and Compliance
US buy-now-pay-later runs on merchant fees and late payments rather than interest. Here is how the models work, what the 2024-25 federal and state rules require, and who bears the risk.
Key takeaways
- Most US BNPL is a closed-end pay-in-4 loan sold at checkout, so revenue comes from merchants and penalty fees rather than interest
- The CFPB's 2024 rule treating BNPL lenders as credit card issuers was withdrawn in May 2025 and will not be reissued
- New York and Illinois now have BNPL-specific statutes, while California, Maryland and New Mexico apply existing lending and licensing law
- Merchant discount rates on BNPL are typically around twice card processing costs, and the fee treatment on returns and disputes is set per agreement
How the US buy-now-pay-later market is structured
"Buy now, pay later" (BNPL) in the United States is not one product. The dominant form is a closed-end installment loan repaid in four or fewer installments with no finance charge, normally 25% down at checkout followed by three payments every two weeks. A second form is the interest-bearing point-of-sale installment loan, commonly running 3 to 36 months. Both sit under one marketing label but fall under different rulebooks, which is why US BNPL policy debates keep turning on definitions rather than on consumer outcomes (CFPB, 89 FR 47068).
The scale is no longer marginal. Originations at five leading lenders rose from $2 billion in 2019 to more than $24 billion in 2021, and repeat use grew with it: the average number of BNPL loans taken by a consumer from a single lender each quarter rose from 1.9 to 2.8, while the share of borrowers with more than five loans per quarter went from 6.3% to 15.5% (same rule, citing the CFPB's 2022 market study). The Federal Reserve's household survey puts BNPL use at 16% of US adults in 2025, up from 15% in 2024 and 10% in 2021, when the question was first asked (Federal Reserve, Report on the Economic Well-Being of U.S. Households in 2025).
Two distribution channels, one origination question
The CFPB distinguishes a merchant-partner model, where the lender contracts with merchants and embeds credit at their checkout, from an app-driven model, where the consumer opens a digital account with the lender and shops directly through the app. For merchants outside the partner network, the lender usually issues a single-use virtual card through an issuer processor and a bank partner (89 FR 47068).
That bank or lending partner matters: it decides who holds the credit risk and which licensing regime applies. The structural trade-offs are covered in our guide to banking as a service and launch-without-a-licence models and in US neobank charter options.
The fee and revenue model: who pays what
There is no single BNPL economics. But almost every US provider draws on the same three buckets: merchant fees, consumer fees and interest, and ancillary services.
Merchant discount rates
Providers rarely publish rate cards. Published rates surface where a large processor resells the product. Stripe's US rate card lists these example prices, alongside its own card rate for comparison (Stripe, US local payment methods pricing):
| Method | Published US list rate | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Klarna | 5.99% + $0.30 | per successful charge |
| Affirm (standard) | 6% + $0.30 | higher on enhanced programs |
| Cash App Afterpay | 6% + $0.30 | per successful charge |
| PayPal Pay Later | 4.99% + $0.49 | US domestic |
| Domestic card (reference) | 2.9% + $0.30 | Stripe's own card rate |
Three caveats stop that table from being a budget line. First, these are list prices for small and mid-sized merchants; large retailers negotiate lower, and providers confirm that fees vary by individual arrangement (CRS, Buy Now, Pay Later: Policy Issues and Options for Congress). Second, the fee is not a card fee, so the card networks' surcharge rules do not apply to it — whether a merchant may pass it to the shopper is decided by the provider agreement. Third, return and dispute treatment differs per provider, and a fee paid on an order that is later refunded is a real cost in high-return categories. For context on the card benchmark being displaced, see our explainer on card interchange fees.
Consumer-side earnings: interest, late fees and subscriptions
On traditional pay-in-4, the consumer pays no finance charge if payments are on time, so merchant fees carry the model. Longer plans can carry interest, and those versions are closed-end credit under the Truth in Lending Act, with the disclosures and arithmetic that implies (89 FR 47068).
Late fees are the least standardised part of the stack. Providers set their own schedules, from capped fee ladders to none at all, which is why the withdrawn federal rule's silence on penalty caps mattered: the interpretive rule applied subpart B of Regulation Z but explicitly did not extend subpart G, "e.g., penalty fee limits and ability-to-repay requirements" (89 FR 47068).
Subscription and membership products are a smaller but growing revenue line; the Congressional Research Service notes that one listed BNPL provider generated 30% of its revenue from a subscription model (CRS).
What the consumer data shows
The Federal Reserve's 2025 survey found that 26% of BNPL users had been late on a payment, and 64% of those late payers — 17% of all BNPL users — said they were charged extra for it. Eleven percent of BNPL users had a BNPL payment trigger an overdraft or non-sufficient-funds fee at their bank, rising to 38% among those charged a late fee (Federal Reserve).
Use is concentrated among households making less than $100,000, Black and Hispanic adults, and adults under 60. In the 2025 survey, 29% of users said BNPL was the only way they could afford the purchase — 40% among users with income below $25,000 (Federal Reserve). An earlier survey round recorded a sharper jump in late payments, from 18% to 24% year over year (Federal Reserve, 2024 report). Collectively these are demand-side facts, not proof of harm: BNPL is cheaper than a revolving card balance for a disciplined payer and more expensive than cash for someone who misses installments.
Federal rules: a rule issued, then withdrawn
US federal BNPL policy between 2024 and 2025 moved in one direction and then reversed.
- 22 May 2024 — the CFPB issued an interpretive rule holding that BNPL lenders issuing "digital user accounts" are card issuers under Regulation Z, and therefore creditors subject to subpart B. Practical duties would have included investigating disputes, pausing payment requirements during an investigation, crediting refunds for returned goods or cancelled services, and sending periodic billing statements (CFPB newsroom).
- 31 May 2024 — published at 89 FR 47068, applicable from 30 July 2024 (GAO).
- October 2024 — a fintech trade association challenged the rule in the District of Columbia, arguing that a change this broad required notice-and-comment rulemaking and that the open-end credit provisions fit closed-end loans badly.
- 6 May 2025 — the CFPB said it would not prioritise enforcement actions based on the rule (CFPB).
- 12 May 2025 — the interpretive rule was withdrawn as part of a broader retreat from agency guidance (90 FR 20084; see also the CFPB's BNPL compliance page). In a status report to the court, the agency said it would not reissue the rule, calling it procedurally defective (Consumer Finance Monitor).
What still applies: interest-bearing installment plans remain closed-end credit under Regulation Z, bank-account debits used to collect installments sit inside the electronic-payment rules that govern preauthorised transfers, and furnishing data to credit bureaus is governed by the Fair Credit Reporting Act. What has gone is a single federal framework for pay-in-4 dispute and statement obligations. On the US side, the same divergence exists in credit scoring, as we set out in data-driven credit scoring in the US and EU.
State-level rules: licensing, underwriting and disclosures
Because there is no federal BNPL licence, licensing is decided state by state — and states have been active.
- California has treated pay-in-4 plans as loans since 2020, so providers must hold a California Financing Law licence, which carries marketing, rate and collection rules (California DFPI).
- Maryland and New Mexico have applied existing lending law to short-term BNPL products rather than writing new statutes (Urban Institute, Mapping the Buy Now Pay Later Regulatory Landscape).
- New York enacted the first comprehensive BNPL statute in 2025 as part of its budget: Article 14-B of the Banking Law requires a licence from the Department of Financial Services, an ability-to-repay assessment, fee and interest caps and Regulation Z-style disclosures, and takes effect 180 days after DFS finalises its implementing rule (N.Y. Banking Law Article 14-B). That rule was still in proposal as of late 2026, meaning licensed-state compliance planning is running ahead of final text (Urban Institute).
- Illinois passed its own BNPL consumer protection act in 2026, adding a licensed, rate-capped regime with underwriting duties (NCLC).
- Connecticut and a multistate coalition of attorneys general investigated major providers' underwriting, fee structures and disclosures in 2025, signalling that enforcement, not only legislation, will shape practice (Urban Institute).
For founders, the design consequence is blunt: a single national launch built on pay-in-4 requires a licensing map, not a compliance page, and the bank-partner structure that avoids a lending licence in one state may not in another. European readers face a different architecture, covered in our BNPL in Europe analysis.
Practical checklist for merchants and founders
- Model the true cost from settlement reports, not the quoted rate: percentage plus fixed fee, return treatment, dispute fees, settlement delay and any reserve held against future losses.
- Check what the agreement says about passing the fee to shoppers; card surcharge rules do not apply.
- Treat dispute handling as a build, not a config: BNPL disputes run through each provider's own process, not the card chargeback scheme.
- On the lending side, map licences state by state, including whether the product is pay-in-4 or interest-bearing, and confirm which entity originates.
- Design autopay and retry logic carefully: repeated debit attempts after insufficient funds are the target of newer state rules and of the overdraft data above; the mechanics are close to those described in our ACH return codes guide.
Risks and costs
For consumers. Late fees on pay-in-4 are set provider by provider and are not capped by the withdrawn federal rule, and roughly one in four BNPL users reported paying late in the Fed's 2025 survey. Autopay collection can trigger overdraft or NSF fees, which hit 11% of users. BNPL debt is often invisible to traditional credit reports, so overcommitment may not surface until affordability breaks. In the US, protections now depend on state law and the individual contract; in the EU, the consumer credit regime applies differently again.
For merchants. BNPL costs roughly 5% to 6% of order value plus a fixed fee at the published list prices shown above, against about 2.9% + $0.30 for a domestic card, so it is a margin decision, not a payment upgrade. Whether fees are returned when an order is refunded depends on the provider agreement, dispute processes are provider-specific, and settlement timing and reserves affect working capital.
For founders and providers. Compliance costs are now state-by-state: licensing, surety bonds, ability-to-repay assessment, fee caps, disclosure formats and data privacy rules, with final texts still moving. Interest-bearing products bring full Regulation Z lending obligations, and credit reporting decisions carry Fair Credit Reporting Act duties.
Bottom line
US BNPL is a merchant-funded, penalty-supported credit product sold at checkout, and it is regulated today by a patchwork rather than a single federal rule: the 2024 interpretive rule that would have treated BNPL lenders as card issuers was withdrawn in May 2025 and will not be reissued, leaving California's licensing approach, New York's and Illinois's new statutes and existing lending law in Maryland and New Mexico as the operative constraints. For anyone building here, licensing strategy, fee-transparency design and autopay behaviour now matter more to unit economics and to legal exposure than the headline interest rate on a pay-in-4 plan.
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